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Abstract  
In empirical studies, survey questions are typically used to measure trust; trust games are also used 
to measure interpersonal trust. In this paper, we measure trust in different institutions by using both 
trust games and survey questions. We find that generalized trust is only weakly correlated with 
trust in specific institutions, when elicited both by using a trust game and by using survey questions. 
However, the correlation between trust in a specific institution elicited through a trust game and 
stated trust for the same institution is stronger and statistically significant. Thus, our findings 
suggest that generalized trust is not an appropriate measure of institutional trust and that more 
specific institutional trust measures should be used. 
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“Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient;  
it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word.  
Unfortunately, this is not a commodity which can be bought very easily. 
 If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what you have bought.”  
 —Arrow (1974, 23) 
 
1. Introduction  
Trust is a key component in economic activities and is seen by many economists as an important 
factor for economic growth (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Fehr, 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001) and institutional development (Helliwell and Putnam, 
1995; La Porta et al., 1999). Investigations of how trust affects different economic outcomes, such 
as economic growth, have traditionally been based on responses to survey questions such as the 
World Values Survey trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Trust in institutions is an important 
factor in explaining why trust has a positive impact on economic growth, typically explained by 
reduced transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust can act as a substitute for reputation in 
facilitating cooperation and coordination when there are transaction costs (Algan and Cahuc, 2013). 
Thus, it is important to understand how people trust institutions per se, because this is a key factor 
in understanding the role of trust in economic prosperity.  
 
However, there are methodological challenges in the measurement of trust in institutions. One 
important question is how well self-reported trust in institutions and self-reported generalized trust 
measures correlate with actual trust, in particular compared with trust elicited in monetarily 
incentivized trust experiments with employees of institutions.  
 
This paper contributes both to methods for investigating trust in institutions and to our 
understanding of trust in institutions. We elicit trust both with a novel institutional trust experiment 
between entrepreneurs and people working at different institutions and with survey questions on 
how entrepreneurs trust institutions per se, as well as how much these entrepreneurs trust the 
institution’s employees. The institutions considered in our study involve a range of government 
institutions and utilities, such as tax authorities and electric utilities, whose activities significantly 
affect entrepreneurs as well as households. As a comparison, we also elicit interpersonal trust using 
both a standard trust experiment and generalized trust questions.  
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One definition of trust is “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent 
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can 
monitor such action … and in a context in which it affects his own action” (Gambetta, 2000, 217). 
In other words, when we say we trust someone, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will 
perform an action that is beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to us is high enough for us to 
consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him (Gambetta, 2000).1 While this definition 
is given in an interpersonal relationship setup, most of the elements could be extended to trust in 
institutions. Put differently, trust in institutions is related to trust in the individuals at the institution, 
as well as to trust in the institution itself.  
 
There is, however, no single definition of institutional trust. Our starting point is an institutional 
theory of trust, where trust means a rational evaluation and expectation that the institution will 
perform satisfactorily (Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1988; Mishler and Rose, 2001). Furthermore, 
our emphasis is on how individuals’ trust might be institution-specific, which means that we will 
take a micro perspective. To what extent an individual trusts a particular institution will depend on 
preferences and experiences, especially one’s personal experiences with the institution. These 
experiences can be general but also can be based very much on specific interactions.  
 
Institutional trust is also related to the concept of linking social capital. Szreter and Woolcock 
(2004) distinguish among three different types of social capital: bonding, bridging, and linking. 
Bonding social capital refers to relationships with other people similar to oneself, while bridging 
refers to relationships with more distant people, such as those of different age or social class. 
Linking social capital defines relationships with others who are in a different power position, such 
as those working for institutions. While trust and social capital are usually used interchangeably in 
the economics literature, distinctions exist between the two, as the former is a subset of the latter 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Loury, 1977; Putnam, 1995). It should be noted that trust experiments 
and most survey questions on trust relate to either bonding or bridging, whereas linking trust has 
not been as extensively studied.  
                                                          
1 For a discussion on how risk affects trust in trust experiments see, e.g., Eckel and Wilson (2004), Schechter (2007), 
and Houser et al. (2010). 
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Trust has primarily been elicited using two different approaches: survey questions and trust 
experiments.2 One of the most commonly used survey questions is the World Values Survey trust 
question mentioned above. Other surveys elicit trust on a scale typically from not trusting at all to 
completely trusting, commonly using other people as the group to trust.  
 
Measures of institutional trust have been based solely on stated measures of trust, and as far as we 
are aware, there have not been any experimental measures. In surveys such as the World Values 
Survey and Gallup World Poll, trust in different government institutions is measured through 
questions such as “Could you tell me how much confidence you have in different institutions listed 
below: quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” However, it has been 
argued that such questions might be measuring how well the institutions are functioning rather than 
how much they are trusted (Beugelsdijk, 2005; Luhmann, 2000). Responses may be based on an 
institution’s reputation, which could just be publicly held opinion about the institution and is 
susceptible to manipulation and stereotype (Misztal, 2013). Therefore, in this study we specifically 
ask how much entrepreneurs trust institutions instead of using the word confidence. More 
important, unlike the usual practice when measuring stated trust in institutions, we ask not only 
about trust in the institution but also about trust in the employees of the institutions. When 
individuals are asked to state how much they trust a given institution, it is not clear whether they 
think of the institution itself, the employees working at the institution, or both. 
 
Another strand of trust research has focused on measuring individual trust using an experimental 
approach. Berg et al. (1995) invented the trust game, which is an experiment that allows causal 
inferences of trust and trustworthiness. The game has since been extensively applied (for an 
overview, see Johnson and Mislin, 2011). Typically, both the trustor and trustee are endowed with 
the same amount of money at the beginning, to rule out the possibility that transfer from trustor to 
trustee might be related to social preferences such as inequality aversion or altruism. The trustor 
can transfer money to a trustee, and any amount sent is tripled before it is handed over to the trustee. 
Then the trustee can return any amount received to the trustor. The game captures the key aspect 
of trust: the more an individual trusts another, the more money she will send, so the amount sent is 
                                                          
2 For a general discussion on using survey questions and experiments, see Falk and Heckman (2009). 
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a measure of trust. The amount returned is interpreted as trustworthiness. If more than one-third of 
the amount received (which is the tripled amount of what the trustor sent) is returned by the trustee, 
then it paid off for the trustor to trust. A meta-study by Johnson and Mislin (2011) shows that 
trustors on average send 50.2 percent of endowment, and trustees return 37.2 percent of amount 
received. Thus, on average it pays off for a trustor to trust, but trustees keep the larger share of the 
surplus generated by trusting. However, these studies have focused on interpersonal trust, and a 
gap in knowledge still exists as to how this would manifest in trust in institutions.  
 
One ongoing area of research is whether behavior elicited in a trust game correlates with self-
reported trust. Most studies find a positive correlation, although the correlations sometimes are 
small (see, e.g.,  Ashraf et al., 2006; Bellemare and Kröger, 2007; Fehr et al., 2003; Holm and 
Danielson, 2005; Johnson and Mislin, 2012). However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no 
empirical studies investigating the level of correlation between these two approaches regarding 
trust in institutions.  
 
In order to measure institutional trust, we needed a set of different institutions and a population that 
has experience with the institution and a belief about the degree of trust. Because of this, we 
conducted the institutional trust experiment with entrepreneurs who own and manage micro, small, 
and medium-sized enterprises in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ethiopia is currently experiencing rapid 
economic growth in which entrepreneurs are important actors. We investigated their trust in four 
different institutions with which they interact frequently. Micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises are seen as an engine of economic growth for developing countries (Daniels, 1999; 
Tybout, 2000). A high level of trust in government creates smooth implementation of economic 
policies, as entrepreneurs will not be suspicious of the government and its intentions (Exadaktylos 
and Zahariadis, 2012). Moreover, trusting entrepreneurs are more likely to deliver on their economic 
responsibilities, such as tax compliance and environmental protection (Kogler et al., 2013; Scholz 
and Lubell, 1998). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe how we measure trust, the 
experiment and survey questions, our sample, and the procedure we followed. Section 3 presents 
both descriptive and econometric analysis of the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes our paper. 
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2. Measurement of institutional trust 
The trust experiment and the survey questions on trust were done as part of a survey study on 
entrepreneurs in Addis Ababa. The whole survey consisted of 11 sections. The trust experiment 
was done in the last section, and the survey questions on institutional trust were done in the middle 
of the survey (section 6), to keep them apart. 
 
2.1. The institutional trust experiment 
The institutional trust experiment followed the same basic design as the standard trust/investment 
game developed by Berg et al. (1995). Both trustors and trustees each received an endowment of 
100 birr (US$4.45, or in terms of purchasing power parity, US$11.53) each, which corresponds to 
roughly 1.5 times a daily laborer’s wage in Addis Ababa during the survey period. This was done 
to eliminate other motives for sending money to the trustee, such as inequality aversion and 
altruism. The trustors had to decide how much to keep and how much to send to a trustee. The 
amount sent to a trustee was tripled, and then the trustee decided how much to keep and how much 
to return to the trustor. There were six different trustees, and subjects were asked how much they 
would send to each of the six trustees, presented in a random order. However, only one of the six 
decisions was played out for real. This was determined by a random draw after all six decisions 
had been made. The randomly selected trustee was then informed about the trust experiment and 
had to decide how much of the amount that had been sent and tripled to return to the trustor and 
how much to keep. This part of the design builds on the experiment of Falk and Zehnder (2013), 
in which each trustor decided how much to send to 12 different trustees, out of whom only one was 
finally payoff relevant. In the trust experiment, we included six different types of trustees: (i) a 
randomly selected resident of Addis Ababa; (ii) a randomly selected owner of a micro, small, and 
medium-sized enterprise in the district (woreda4); (iii) a randomly selected employee at the 
district’s (woreda’s) micro and small enterprises development agency; (iv) a randomly selected 
employee at the district (woreda) administration; (v) a randomly selected employee at the district 
(woreda) tax authority; and (vi) a randomly selected employee at a subregional branch of the 
                                                          
3 At the time of the experiment (April 2017), the exchange rate was US$1 to 22.8 Birr.and.the purchasing power was 
US$1 to 8.7 Birr.  
4 A woreda is an administrative government unit in the capital Addis Ababa. The city is divided into 10 subcities. 
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electric utility. The presented order was randomized for each subject. The first category, a 
randomly selected resident of Addis Ababa, can be used as a benchmark to previous trust games. 
 
For each decision, the trustor was given one blue and one green envelope with the same number 
printed on each envelope. The blue envelope contained 100 birr. The green envelope was empty 
and had the type of trustee printed on it. The trustor was told to put the amount of money he would 
like to send to the specific trustee in the green envelope. Once the trustor had made a decision, he 
was asked to seal the envelope (even if he had decided to send nothing) and give it to the 
enumerator. The enumerator turned her back during the decision process so that the trustor could 
make his decision in secrecy. This procedure was repeated six times. To reduce the influence of 
order effects, we randomized the order in which the trustees were presented. Once the trustor was 
done with all six decisions, the enumerator rolled a six-sided die to determine which of the six 
trustees would receive the payout. The blue envelope that corresponded to the randomly drawn 
number was given directly to the trustor, while the green envelope was kept for transfer to the 
trustee.  
 
In the next step, depending on which of the six trustees had been randomly selected, a trustee 
matching the criteria was randomly selected (as described below) and then approached and 
informed about the experiment. After the instructions had been read, the trustee was given a green 
envelope containing the tripled amount and an empty blue envelope. The enumerator asked the 
trustee to decide how much money he would like to send back to the trustor and how much to keep 
for himself. The enumerator then turned her back so that the trustee could make the decision in 
private. The trustee was instructed to put the amount of money he would like to send back in the 
empty blue envelope. Once the trustee was done, he sealed the blue envelope and gave it to the 
enumerator, keeping the green one for himself.  
 
The enumerator brought back to the principal researchers the five pairs of envelopes that had not 
been selected to be payout relevant and one single envelope from the payout-relevant decision that 
contained the amount to be sent to the trustee. The principal researchers opened the envelopes, 
recorded the amounts sent, and put the tripled amount in a new envelope given to the randomly 
selected trustee. 
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2.2. Stated trust 
The stated institutional trust measures asked respondents to state how much they trust a given 
institution on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents having no trust at all and 10 represents a 
situation of complete trust. By specifically asking about trust, we avoid any confusion and 
ambiguity that might arise from asking about confidence, as is done in the World Values Survey. 
The stated trust questions were asked in the middle of the firm survey, and well before the trust 
experiment, to avoid having the subjects remember exactly what they answered. We separately 
elicited the trust that entrepreneurs have toward the institutions and toward the employees working 
in these institutions. The question to measure trust for an institution was “Please tell me on a scale 
of 0 to 10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions listed below, where 0 means you 
do not trust the institution at all and 10 means you have complete trust.” The question to measure 
trust for employees at the institutions was “Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10 how much you 
personally trust an employee/individual of the institutions listed below, where 0 means you do not 
trust the employee/individual at all and 10 means you have complete trust.” 
 
2.3. Description of sample 
We sampled the trustors from all micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Addis Ababa in 
two stages. First, we randomly chose 260 firms from a list of more than 20,000 registered micro, 
small, and medium-sized enterprises obtained from the Addis Ababa Trade Bureau and the Central 
Statistical Agency. Then we chose owner-managers of these enterprises to be the subjects in our 
study, because they are the ones who make important decisions and hence have a direct working 
relationship with the different government institutions. If an enterprise had more than one owner, 
we selected the owner who was most involved in the day-to-day operation of the enterprise. From 
this selected sample, only two entrepreneurs refused to participate in the trust experiment because 
they thought the experiment went against their religious beliefs.5 In a few cases, the respondents 
were general managers or spouses of the owners.6 Descriptive statistics of the trustors are presented 
in Table 1.  
                                                          
5 Two of the respondents who refused to participate were Muslims who said that the experiment resembled a gamble.  
6 Such cases account for about 3 percent of our sample (9 enterprises), and the results are robust without these 
observations as well. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of trustors 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Age (in years) 257 38.34 10.20 22 76 
At least college diploma 258 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Male  255 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Married  258 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Christian orthodox 251 0.76 0.42 0 1 
Muslim 251 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Protestant 251 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Preference for risk taking (between 0 and 10, 
where 10 is completely risk taking) 258 4.63 3.31 0 10 
Business experience (in years) 253 6.88 6.28 0 43 
Total no. of employees 258 10.05 11.95 1 86 
Industry zone location  258 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Monthly revenue (in 1,000 birr) 255 45.59 113.99 0 1,000 
More than one owner 258 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Amhara (=1 if ethnically Amhara) 258 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Oromo (=1 if ethnically Oromo) 258 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Guraghe (=1 if ethnically Guraghe) 258 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Tigray (=1 if from Tigray) 258 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Other ethnic groups 258 0.09 0.29 0 1 
 
About one-third of the trustors have attained at least a college diploma, and 78 percent of them are 
men. We also asked trustors regarding their risk preferences using a stated risk question. The stated 
risk preference question was asked on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents completely risk 
averse and 10 represents completely risk taking. Using this measure, an average trustor in our 
sample considers himself as risk neutral. The average experience as a business owner is almost 
seven years. In terms of business locations, about a third of the micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises that trustors own or represent are located in industry zones or clusters. These clusters 
are government-provided production areas usually with a very low rental rates. In terms of monthly 
revenue, an average micro, small, or medium-sized enterprise owned by a trustor reports about 
45,000 birr. 
 
The trustees in our experiment were from six different groups. The first two categories included a 
randomly selected resident of Addis Ababa and an entrepreneur operating in the trustor’s district. 
The other four categories were government institutions that implement rules at the district level 
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and provide various services that are sometimes important for the establishment, survival, and 
growth of firms. The entrepreneurship development agency is mainly responsible to nurture 
entrepreneurship. This agency provides technical support, facilitates financial access through loans, 
establishes market linkages through business fairs, and offers business training. The district 
(woreda) administration is the lowest level of the executive branch of the Ethiopian government in 
Addis Ababa. It issues and renews licenses, executes government’s labor and environmental 
regulations, and provides local-level public infrastructure. The third government institution 
included as a trustee was the tax authority, which is mainly responsible for introduction and 
enforcement of tax regulations at the lowest administrative level. It provides tax identification 
numbers, requires businesses to report monthly income statements, collects taxes of different kinds, 
and takes legal measures against tax evaders. The fourth institution is the electric utility, a public 
utility that is solely responsible for both the generation and distribution of electricity service across 
the whole country, making it a natural monopoly. The utility also collects electricity fees and 
provides technical support during power outages. These four government institutions together 
provide the overwhelming majority of services that micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
operating in Addis Ababa require for their very existence. Entrepreneurs make frequent visits to 
the offices of these institutions, giving them the opportunity to interact with the employees of the 
institutions starting from the time their firms were established and continuing during their 
operation.  
 
The micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises owned and operated by trustors in our experiment 
are located in different parts of Addis Ababa and are served by different branches of the institutions. 
This is mainly because of the decentralized structure of the government offices in the city. The city 
administration is divided into 10 subcities, which are further decentralized into 116 districts 
(woredas). Three of the institutions we consider in our experiment—the tax authority, 
entrepreneurship development agency, and district administration—have their lowest 
administrative branches at the district level, and each has about 85 different branches. Unlike the 
other three institutions, the electric utility is organized into four regional branches.7 Even though 
pay scales are generally similar for a similar position within each branch of a given institution, as 
                                                          
7 East, West, North, and South Addis Ababa offices. 
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they are set to be equal by the government, there might be heterogeneity in how employees perform 
their work.  
 
We collected a range of observable characteristics for each branch of the institutions from the 
human resource departments. Since the owners of the micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
are in frequent contact with all these institutions, they get to observe and have perceptions about 
the individuals working in these institutions. In addition, other characteristics of employees such 
as average earnings and educational qualifications are common knowledge among the general 
population, as this information is publicly available. Table 2 presents the average socioeconomic 
characteristics of employees of the institutions.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of employees of the institutions 
Institution 
Average monthly 
salary 
Average age 
Proportion of 
men 
Proportion of employees 
with at least a college 
diploma 
Entrepreneurship dev. agency 
4,926 
(1,199) 
30.20 
(2.09) 
0.75 
(0.19) 
0.83 
(0.17) 
Tax authority 
5,998 
(1,298) 
34.48  
(2.93) 
0.52 
(0.25) 
0.47 
(0.21) 
District 
2,861 
(704) 
32.33 
 (2.45) 
0.49 
(0.09) 
0.52 
(0.09) 
Electric utility 
3,973 
(131) 
38.94 
(2.09) 
0.74 
(0.02) 
0.55 
(0.07) 
 
Among the four institutions, the entrepreneurship development agency has the youngest 
employees, but it has the largest proportion of male employees and the highest number of 
employees having at least a college diploma. The tax authority has the largest average salary, while 
it also has the lowest share of workers who have at least a college diploma. Compared with the 
other three institutions, the electric utility employees have the highest average age.  
 
2.4. Procedure 
The trust experiment was part of a larger firm survey, conducted in collaboration with the Ethiopian 
Development Research Institute (EDRI). As the institute conducts a wide range of surveys among 
both households and firms in the city, it was known to most of the participants as a neutral research 
institute. Moreover, to assure participants that both the survey and the experiment were being 
conducted for the sole purpose of research, enumerators presented an official letter issued by EDRI 
addressed to the respective enterprises explaining this and asking for their participation. We believe 
the political neutrality of the institute and the assurances participants were given that their 
responses would be treated with the utmost confidentiality ensured good quality of the responses. 
Enumerators were given physical addresses of the micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
randomly selected for participation. Upon arrival at the participants’ places of business, 
enumerators were instructed to first introduce themselves and show the official letter from EDRI 
asking if the participant would like to participate in a survey. If the answer was yes, the survey was 
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conducted either immediately or by appointment in situations where the owner or manager of the 
enterprise was not present during the first visit.8 
 
In the last part of the survey, the trust experiment was conducted. An enumerator read aloud the 
instructions, explaining that both trustor and trustee would have the same initial endowment, the 
different stages of the experiment, and how payout would be determined. We also incorporated 
three different examples elaborating the outcomes of different decisions. To reduce any influence 
that providing examples might have, two of the examples had either a small or a large amount being 
sent, while the third presented a situation where half of the endowment was sent. As our subjects 
were entrepreneurs and hence relatively literate individuals, it was easy for them to understand the 
experiment even without the examples, as we already knew from our pilot studies. However, to 
avoid any possible misunderstanding, we kept this format. We informed trustors that they would 
be paid within four weeks. 
 
The trustees were selected in different ways depending on which group they belonged to. For the 
randomly selected resident of Addis Ababa, we drew from a sample list of about 35,000 households 
obtained from EDRI,9 taking into account the population densities of the 10 subcities of Addis 
Ababa. From each of the 10 subcities, we randomly chose one district. Based on the population 
densities, we randomly chose three individuals from eight of the districts and two individuals from 
the remaining two districts. For fellow entrepreneurs operating in the trustor’s district, we randomly 
selected them from a list of registered micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises operating in the 
same district as the trustor. To choose trustees who were employees of the four government 
institutions, we first obtained complete lists of employees of each district branch. From these lists, 
one person was randomly selected if that institution had been drawn in the first stage.10 For each 
randomly selected employee, we provided enumerators, with one reserve employee as a 
replacement in case the employee was on leave or away for longer period.11  
 
                                                          
8 In case the owners or managers of someenterprises could not be reached, we had also prepared a replacement list in 
advance. 
9 We used this list because it was impossible to obtain an official registry. 
10 However, it is possible that more than one employee of a given local branch of the institution would be selected as 
a trustee if there had been more than one draw of trustors served by the given branch in the first stage.  
11 In practice, this happened in only a few instances, about 2 percent of the cases.  
14 
 
Trustees were then approached and informed about the trust experiment in similar manner as the 
trustors, including all details. The instructions were also read out loud to the trustees, and they were 
then informed about what happened during the first stage of the experiment. We also presented 
them with similar examples as for the trustors. Once the instructions were read, trustees were each 
given two envelopes, a green envelope containing the tripled amount and a blue envelope that was 
empty. After the trustees had made their decisions, the enumerators brought the blue envelopes 
back to the principal researchers, who counted and recorded the amounts sent back by the trustees. 
The trustors were then contacted again and received the money the trustees had sent.  
 
3. Results 
We first present the results from the trust experiment followed by the stated trust, then compare 
experimental results and stated trust including generalized trust.  
 
3.1. The institutional trust experiment 
In total, we had 258 trustors deciding how much of their endowment to send to the trustee. 
Descriptive statistics of the amounts sent are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Average amount sent by trustors to the different trustee categories (N = 258) 
 
There are clear differences when it comes to the amount sent to the different trustee categories. 
Only 9 percent of our sample sent the same amount to all the trustee categories. The trustors sent 
considerably more to a random person in the city and an entrepreneur than to any of the employees 
of the four institutions. Among the institutions, the highest amount was sent to an employee at the 
entrepreneurship development agency. This is perhaps not surprising, since the main task for them 
is to support entrepreneurs. The amount sent to an employee at the electric utility was about 30 
percent lower than the amount sent to a random person in the city. In a more detailed analysis of 
the amount sent, we look at the proportion of trustors who sent zero and the amount sent conditional 
on sending a nonzero amount. The proportion of trustors sending zero to the trustee categories 
ranged from 0.078 for a random person to 0.225 for an employee of the electric utility, while the 
conditional amount sent ranged from 51 percent for an entrepreneur in the same district to 41.35 
percent for an electric utility employee. Interestingly, a district administration employee, tax 
authority employee, and electric utility employee are less likely to receive any amount and also 
receive less than the other three trustee categories conditional on receiving money.  
 
In Table 4, we provide a more detailed comparison of the amounts sent to the six different 
categories and a statistical test of the differences.  
 
Trustee category 
Mean amount 
sent 
Std. dev. 
Proportion of 
trustors sending 
zero  
Mean amount 
sent conditional 
on sending 
nonzero  
A resident of Addis Ababa 45.74 28.35 0.078 49.58 
Entrepreneur in the same district 45.66 28.79 0.105 51.00 
Entrepreneurship dev. agency employee  43.53 28.38 0.132 50.13 
District administration employee 35.54 27.55 0.178 43.25 
Tax authority employee 34.57 30.70 0.213 43.94 
Electric utility employee  32.05 28.27 0.225 41.35 
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Table 4. Differences in amounts sent among trustee categories (p-values of Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test in parentheses) (N = 258) 
 Entrepreneur in 
the district 
Entrepreneurship 
dev. agency 
District 
(woreda) 
Tax authority Electric utility 
A resident of 
Addis Ababa 
0.08 
(0.707) 
2.21 
(0.471) 
10.20*** 
(<0.001) 
11.17*** 
(<0.001) 
13.69*** 
(<0.001) 
Entrepreneur in 
the same district 
 
2.13 
(0.247) 
10.12*** 
(<0.001) 
11.09*** 
(<0.001) 
13.61*** 
(<0.001) 
Entrepreneurship 
dev. agency  
 
 
7.99*** 
(<0.001) 
8.96*** 
(<0.001) 
11.48*** 
(<0.001) 
District 
administration 
  
 
0.97 
(0.727) 
3.49 
(0.135) 
Tax authority     
2.52** 
(0.035) 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Pairwise comparisons of amounts sent to different categories show that the amounts sent are 
statistically significantly different for most of the combinations (10 out of 15 cases). The largest 
difference is when we compare the amounts sent to our benchmark groups (random 
person/entrepreneur) and the institutions. The differences are also statistically significant when we 
compare the amount sent for the entrepreneurship development agency with the three other 
institutions: the amount of money sent to the development agency is consistently higher. Among 
the remaining three institutions, the amount sent to an employee of the tax authority is statistically 
significantly higher than the amount sent to an employee at the electric utility. Overall, what we 
find is that micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise owners appear to have less trust in 
government institutions with which they have a frequent and direct working relationship.  
 
Next, we investigate to what extent observables correlate with the amounts sent to the four different 
institutions, and the regression results are shown in Table 5. We pool the observations for the four 
different institutions and include a number of characteristics describing the institutions and the 
trustor. In the first model, we only include dummy variables for the different institutions (with the 
entrepreneurship development agency as the base group), and in the second model, we include 
institutional and trustor characteristics. 
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Table 5. Regression models with amount sent in the trust game as dependent variable  
 
 (1) (2) 
Institutional dummies (base group = entrepreneurship development agency) 
Tax authority –9.131 –10.674 
 (4.24)*** (1.90)* 
Electricity utility –12.488 –12.300 
 (6.27)*** (3.19)*** 
District administration  –8.581 –2.144 
 (4.47)*** (0.51) 
Institutional characteristics 
Average salary ('000 birr)  2.183 
  (1.65)* 
Average age  0.266 
  (0.70) 
Proportion of males  7.151 
  (0.95) 
Proportion of employees with college diploma and above  2.313 
  (0.26) 
Trustor characteristics 
Age (in years)  0.309 
  (1.85)* 
At least college diploma  0.467 
  (0.14) 
Male  –4.888 
  (1.39) 
Married  4.588 
  (1.43) 
Risk preference  0.867 
  (1.99)** 
Business experience  –0.158 
  (0.60) 
Total no. of employees  0.120 
  (0.79) 
Industry Zone Location  7.837 
  (2.33)** 
Monthly revenue (in 1000 Birr)  –0.015 
  (0.99) 
More than one owner  –7.739 
  (2.27)** 
Religion dummies (base group = orthodox Christian)   
Muslim  1.948 
  (0.33) 
Protestant  4.870 
  (1.11) 
Ethnicity dummies (base group = Tigray) 
Amhara   7.330 
  (1.69)* 
Oromo   9.267 
  (1.79)* 
Guraghe   1.494 
  (0.30) 
Other ethnic groups  2.518 
  (0.38) 
Constant 44.41 –1.014 
 (21.00)*** (0.05) 
R2  0.024 0.104 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.081 
Number of observations 911 911 
Note: The dependent variable is the amount of money sent to each of the trustee in the trust game. Standard errors are clustered at a trustor level. 
 *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Model 1 confirms the descriptive statistics, where in particular, the tax authority and the electric 
utility are sent lower amounts of money than the entrepreneur development agency. Only one of 
the institutional characteristics is statistically significant: trustors send more to the trustee when the 
average salary is higher. Thus, institutions with employees with a higher socioeconomic status are 
more trusted. Among the trustor characteristics, only a few are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. If the business is located in an industry zone and if it has only one owner, then the 
amount sent is higher. Trustors who identify themselves as more risk taking send more to the 
trustee, and older trustors send more. The ethnicity of trustors also affects institutional trust, though 
this is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Trustors who are ethnic Amharas and 
Oromos (the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia) appear to have higher trust in the institutions 
compared with others. 
 
3.2. Stated trust 
Table 6 shows the level of stated trust for the six different groups of trustees. Note that for the four 
institutions, we asked two questions, one specifically about employees at the institution and one 
about the institution itself. The first question was asked for micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises in general as well, since the individual question concerned an owner or manager or the 
business entity itself. The second question is not used in our analysis. 
 
Table 6. Stated trust in institutions: trust in employee working the institution and the institution 
in general 
Trustee category 
  Employee Institutions Sig-rank 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. p-values 
A resident of Addis Ababa 235 5.41 2.08 n/a n/a n/a 
Entrepreneur in the district 235 5.51 2.11 5.47 2.32 0.330 
Entrepreneurship dev. agency 235 5.53 2.41 5.86 2.69 0.004 
District administration 235 5.18 2.38 5.24 2.73 0.239 
Tax authority 235 4.98 2.27 5.40 2.62 0.001 
Electric utility 235 4.56 2.29 4.90 2.71 0.034 
 
We begin by comparing the stated trust in the employee and in the institution. The correlation 
coefficients are between 0.64 and 0.67. Thus, there is a substantial degree of correlation, although 
it is far from perfect. In general, the stated trust levels are higher when subjects are asked about the 
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institution than when asked about the employees. Furthermore, the variation in stated trust shows 
the same pattern as the variation in transferred amount in the trust game, in the sense that the trust 
is highest for a random person in Addis Ababa and an entrepreneur in the district, while it is lowest 
for the electric utility.  
 
Next, we investigate whether there are observables that correlate with stated institutional trust in 
the same manner as we investigated amounts sent in the trust game as shown in Table 5. Again, we 
pool the responses for the four institutions. We use stated trust in the institution (the results are 
similar if we use stated trust in the employee). The results are presented in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Regression models with stated trust in institutions as dependent variable 
Institutional dummies (base group = entrepreneurship development agency) (1) (2) 
Tax authority –0.530 –0.365 
 (2.61)*** (0.65) 
Electric utility  –1.097 –0.831 
 (5.17)*** (2.00)** 
District administration –0.706 –0.717 
 (3.44)*** (1.68)* 
Institutional characteristics  
Average salary (in 1,000 birr)  –0.031 
  (0.27) 
Average age  –0.029 
  (0.85) 
Proportion of males  –0.159 
  (0.23) 
Proportion of employees with college diploma and above  0.084 
  (0.09) 
Trustor characteristics  
Age (in years)  –0.023 
  (1.25) 
At least college diploma   –0.280 
  (0.95) 
Male  –0.617 
  (1.87)* 
Married  –0.355 
  (1.16) 
Risk preference  0.073 
  (1.62) 
Business experience  0.043 
  (1.67)* 
Total no. of employees  0.003 
  (0.24) 
Industry zone location  –0.260 
  (0.85) 
Monthly revenue (in 1,000 birr)  –0.002 
  (1.45) 
More than one owner  0.130 
  (0.40) 
Religion dummies (base group = orthodox Christian)  
Muslim  0.296 
  (0.58) 
Protestant  –0.171 
  (0.55) 
Ethnicity dummies (base group = Tigray)  
Amhara  
 0.298  
 (0.69) 
Oromo   1.194  
 (2.36)** 
Guraghe   0.941  
 (1.91)* 
Other ethnic groups  0.101 
  (0.18) 
Constant 5.985 7.681 
 (31.70)*** (4.11)*** 
R2  0.021 0.085 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.059 
Number of observations 835 835 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at a trustor level. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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None of the institutional characteristics are statistically significant. Stated trust in the electric utility 
and the district administration is statistically significantly lower than stated trust in the development 
agency.  
 
3.3. Comparison of trust game and stated trust 
 Let us now compare the trust game and stated trust in more detail. To begin with, we report 
correlation coefficients for both stated trust measures, as shown in Table 8.  
Table 8. Correlation between amounts sent in the trust game and stated measures of trust 
Institution 
Trust in the game and stated 
trust in institutions 
Trust in the game and stated 
trust in the employees of the 
institutions 
Trust in the game and 
generalized trust 
 Correlation P-value Correlation P-value Correlation P-value 
Entrepreneurship dev. 
agency 
0.21 0.001 0.22 <0.001 0.11 0.103 
District 
administration 
0.27 <0.001 0.32 0.005 0.17 0.009 
Tax authority  0.23 <0.001 0.19 0.002 0.14 0.029 
Electric utility  0.37 <0.001 0.42 <0.001 0.17 0.008 
 
The correlation coefficients between stated trust (for both the institution and employees) and 
amount sent in the trust game, which range between 0.19 and 0.42, are considerably smaller than 
the correlations between the two stated trust measures, which we found to range from 0.64 to 0.67. 
At the same time, they are all statistically significantly different from zero. Squaring the correlation 
coefficient yields the variance explained; thus, a correlation coefficient of 0.42 means that almost 
18 percent of the variance is explained. If we compare these correlation coefficients with what has 
been reported in the literature regarding generalized trust and trust games, the correlations found 
here are still rather large. For example, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2013) found a correlation 
coefficient of 0.13 when comparing the proportion sent in a trust game and stated trust among 
Bangladesh subjects. Table 8 also shows that the correlation between generalized trust and trust in 
the experiment is considerably lower. It is almost half of the correlation between the specific stated 
trust question and trust in the experiment.  
 
To explore this further, we next report the average amount sent in the trust game for different levels 
of stated trust. Figure 1 shows in more detail the relationship between the average amounts sent 
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and stated level of trust. For example, for the electric utility, the average amount sent is 16 birr for 
the lowest level of trust and 46 birr for the highest level of trust.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean amount sent in the experiment for each stated trust level; 95 percent confidence 
interval using 1,000 bootstraps and the percentile method 
 
Finally, in Table 9, we now include the stated trust measures in the regression models with the 
amount sent in the institutional trust game as the dependent variable. In the first column, we report 
the results of model 3 from Table 7, but with a smaller sample, since we exclude subjects that did 
not answer all stated trust questions.12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 In most cases, this is because they replied “do not know,” although one trustor refused to answer the questions. 
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Table 9. Determinants of amount sent in the trust game, including stated trust as explanatory 
variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Institutional dummies (base group = entrepreneurship dev. agency)  
Tax authority –7.955 –9.797 –8.283 –8.836 
 (1.36) (1.24) (1.04) (1.55) 
Electricity utility –11.966 –16.840 –16.087 –11.787 
 (2.93)*** (2.67)*** (2.59)** (2.90)*** 
District (woreda) administration  –2.045 –6.789 –5.462 –2.591 
 (0.47) (1.06) (0.87) (0.61) 
 Stated trust  
Stated trust tax authority  2.675 2.764  
  (3.67)*** (3.80)***  
Stated trust district admin.  3.591 3.554  
  (4.91)*** (4.86)***  
Stated trust electric utility  3.833 3.826  
  (6.19)*** (6.01)***  
Stated trust entrep. dev. agency  2.495 2.600  
  (3.09)*** (3.28)***  
Generalized trust    1.882 
    (2.84)*** 
 Institution characteristics   
Average salary (in 1,000 birr) 1.478 1.896  1.586 1.575 
 (1.03) (1.40) (1.16) (1.12) 
Average age 0.123 0.227 0.214 0.055 
 (0.30) (0.57) (0.54) (0.14) 
Proportion of males 10.131 7.298 10.243 8.583 
 (1.28) (0.95) (1.33) (1.11) 
Prop. employees with diploma 3.065 1.184 2.238 1.210 
 (0.32) (0.13) (0.24) (0.13) 
 Trustor characteristics 
Age (in years) 0.302 0.361 0.372 0.286 
 (1.71)* (2.07)** (2.17)** (1.63) 
At least college diploma 0.128 0.222 0.861 1.326 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.26) (0.39) 
Male –4.279 –3.356 –2.463 –2.981 
 (1.16) (1.03) (0.73) (0.84) 
Married 5.296 6.494 6.358 4.067 
 (1.56) (1.91)* (1.92)* (1.23) 
Risk preference 0.806 0.473 0.559 0.384 
 (1.70)* (1.04) (1.26) (0.79) 
Business experience –0.100 –0.183 –0.241 –0.153 
 (0.34) (0.68) (0.86) (0.54) 
Total no. of employees 0.105 0.089 0.106 0.172 
 (0.64) (0.54) (0.65) (0.99) 
Industry zone location 6.902 7.757 7.693 8.775 
 (2.00)** (2.49)** (2.47)** (2.56)** 
Monthly revenue (in 1,000 birr) –0.014 –0.006 –0.008 –0.013 
 (0.67) (0.28) (0.41) (0.65) 
More than one owner –8.224 –7.382 –8.668 –8.783 
 (2.33)** (2.41)** (2.64)*** (2.55)** 
 Religion dummies (base group = orthodox Christian) 
Muslim 2.529 –0.012 1.450 1.073 
 (0.41) (0.00) (0.25) (0.17) 
Protestant 3.399 4.376 3.842 1.998 
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 (0.68) (0.91) (0.78) (0.39) 
 Ethnicity dummies (base group = Tigray) 
Amhara (=1 if ethnically Amhara) 6.806  5.526 8.227 
 (1.40)  (1.21) (1.80)* 
Oromo (=1 if ethnically Oromo) 7.968  3.873 9.293 
 (1.40)  (0.71) (1.75)* 
Guraghe (=1 if ethnically 
Guraghe) 
0.768  –3.503 1.321 
 (0.11)  (0.67) (0.26) 
Other ethnic groups –0.272  0.221 5.133 
 (0.05)  (0.03) (0.73) 
Constant 5.163 –9.783 –14.440 1.721 
 (0.26) (0.50) (0.74) (0.09) 
R2  0.103 0.171 0.183 0.125 
Adjusted R2  0.077 0.148 0.156 0.099 
Number of observations 835 835 835 835 
Note: Dependent variable: amount of money sent for each trustee in the trust game. Standard errors are clustered at the trustor level. *, **, *** 
denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Let us begin by comparing models 1 and 3 in Table 9. In model 3, we add the stated trust measures, 
and all four stated trust measures are statistically significant.13 Including stated trust results in an 
increase in the adjusted R2 from 0.077 to 0.156, almost exactly a doubling of the predictive power 
of the model. Excluding other explanatory variables, as in model 2, does not affect the statistical 
significance or magnitudes of the stated trust coefficients to any large extent. Thus, there is a 
consistent positive relationship between stated trust and behavior in the trust game. There is, 
however, some variation among institutions. We find the strongest correlation between the trust 
game and stated trust for the electric utility and the lowest for the entrepreneurship development 
agency.  
 
Finally, we investigate the correlation between behaviors in the trust game and the generalized 
measure of trust. In model 4, we estimate a model where we include the generalized trust response 
instead of stated trust in institutions. The coefficient for generalized trust is positive and statistically 
significant. However, the coefficient is smaller than the corresponding ones for institutional stated 
trust, again indicating that the relationship between generalized trust and behavior in the 
institutional trust game is weaker. Including generalized trust results in an increase in the adjusted 
R2 from 0.077 to 0.099, which is also a considerably smaller increase than when including stated 
trust in institutions. 
 
                                                          
13 We conduct a joint significance test of the stated measures, and we reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly 
different from zero by using an F-test (p-value < 0.001). 
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4. Conclusions 
Trust has traditionally been measured by using generalized trust questions or trust games with a 
focus on investigating interpersonal trust and how trust affects economic growth—that is, bonding 
or bridging trust. The objective of this paper is to contribute to the trust literature on measurement 
of linking trust. We measured trust in institutions by using both a novel institutional trust 
experiment and stated trust questions. We used entrepreneurs as the trustors and different types of 
institutions with which they frequently interact as trustees. We conducted our study in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, which is currently experiencing rapid economic growth and where entrepreneurs 
are important actors for this growth.  
 
Overall, we find a low level of trust toward institutions. As these institutions provide services that 
are important for the survival and growth of firms, the low level of trust implies that these working 
relationships could be ineffective. In particular, firms could be suspicious of policies and 
technologies introduced by these institutions. They might also be reluctant to deliver on their civic 
and economic responsibilities such as tax compliance and environmental protection, in light of the 
low levels of trust they hold for these institutions. 
 
Moreover, we find that entrepreneurs have different levels of trust in different institutions, with 
trust in our sample being lowest for the electric utility and the tax authority. This finding indicates 
that it is important to measure institution-specific trust. Our results show that stated trust in a 
specific institution and the amount sent to the same institution in the experiment is positively 
correlated and statistically significant. On the other hand, generalized trust, or trust measured as 
the amount sent to a random individual, is only weakly correlated with institutional trust, although 
the correlation is still positive and statistically significant. These findings have important 
implications on how to elicit trust, for both stated trust and trust games, and the takeaway message 
is that in both cases, trust should be domain-specific. How much trust varies among domains and 
what can be considered to be one domain of trust are important topics for future research to analyze 
in more detail.  
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